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Leonard v.B. Sutton Colloquium
Keynote Address
United Nations Peacekeeping: The Years
Past, The Years Ahead*
JOE BYRNES SILLS**
As we enter the United Nations' (U.N.) fiftieth year, it is appropri-
ate to begin by looking back to San Francisco in 1945. The organiza-
tion created there, the United Nations, adopted and continued Frank-
lin Roosevelt's name for the alliance against fascism. It was estab-
lished to ensure that the horrors of the war just past would not be in-
flicted on future generations. The basic assumption on which the U.N.
was created was that the alliance which won the war would remain
together to preserve the peace. But reality quickly set in. The Cold
War began and, as Winston Churchill so eloquently stated, an Iron
Curtain fell across Europe.
As a result, in the political sphere, the U.N. was largely
marginalized. The veto, and the threat of the veto, immobilized the
Security Council. The military staff committee, the Charter mechanism
for continuing collective security, was dormant.
The focus shifted to the General Assembly. The temporary ab-
sence of the Soviet Union, in protest, from the Security Council had
allowed the U.N. to act in Korea. But it was obvious that this curious
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error in judgment was unlikely to be repeated. In 1950, therefore, the
General Assembly, under United States leadership, adopted the "Unit-
ing for Peace" resolution. Under the Charter, the Assembly is prohibit-
ed from dealing with an item if the Security Council is considering it.
However, since the Charter assigns primary responsibility for the
maintenance of peace and security to the Council, it was reasoned that
secondary responsibility had to reside somewhere. Where else but in
the Assembly? The resolution, therefore, empowered the Assembly to
deal with threats to the peace if the Council was unable to do so. Thus,
in 1956, following the Suez Crisis, the Uniting for Peace resolution was
utilized to create the first UN peacekeeping force.
The concept of peacekeeping does not exist in the U.N. Charter. It
was born of necessity as a holding action until peaceful settlement of
armed conflict could be reached through negotiations. Falling between
Chapter 6, which contains provisions for peaceful settlement of dis-
putes, and Chapter 7, which sets out procedures for enforcement action
to deal with "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression,"' peacekeeping is often referred to as "Chapter 6 112" of
the U.N. Charter.
For over forty of peacekeeping's forty-seven years, the ground
rules have been defined very clearly. Peacekeeping meant the use of
multilateral military personnel, provided voluntarily by member
states, under international command, functioning with the consent of
the host government and other parties involved, and whose goal is to
help control and resolve conflicts between hostile states. Peacekeepers
traditionally are either unarmed or lightly armed. They are authorized
to use weapons only in self-defense, must remain impartial among the
parties, and must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host coun-
try.
Over the last five years, however, none of these guidelines has
been left untouched. The need for consent of the parties has sometimes
been overridden by humanitarian imperatives. Volatile situations in
the field have made it necessary to expand the definitions of both self-
defense and the justified use of force. Even the range and nature of
international command is now being hotly debated - at least in Wash-
ington. Mandates have far exceeded the traditional supervision of
truces and separation of antagonists. They now comprise duties as
diverse as monitoring free and fair elections, guaranteeing the delivery
of humanitarian aid in war zones, overseeing land reforms and human
rights, reintegrating armed combatants into productive civilian roles,
intervening in situations of civil war, establishing safe and secure
environments, and remaining in towns and villages under attack to
prevent loss of life.
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
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With this expansion of duties, demand has grown. In 1988, there
were five U.N. peacekeeping operations. In 1992, there were eleven. At
present, there are sixteen. Over the same period, the number of mili-
tary personnel involved in peacekeeping has gone from 9,600 to close
to 70,000. The largest operation is the U.N. protection force in the
former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), with a size of about 40,000 and an
annual budget of $1.6 billion. The smallest is the U.N. observer mis-
sion in Tajikistan (UNMOT). It is made up of 17 military observers
and costs $1 million annually. Overall, peacekeeping operations cost
$3.5 billion in 1994. In 1995, the figure will be lower, about $3.1 bil-
lion, largely due to the closing down of UNOSOM in Somalia. Over
half a million people have served in these operations since 1948. Some
1,300 of these individuals have given their lives in the cause of peace.
The first two peacekeeping operations - the U.N. Truce Supervi-
sion Organization (UNTSO), based in Jerusalem, established in 1948,
and the U.N. Military Observer Group In India and Pakistan
(UNMOGIP), established in 1945 - were observer missions with only
military officers participating. As I mentioned earlier, it was the third
operation, the UN emergency force established in the Sinai in the
wake of the Suez Crisis, which involved troops for the first time. Since
then, peacekeeping operations have utilized either peacekeeping forces
or observer missions.
In 1989, the U.N. Transition Assistance Group in Namibia
(UNTAG) was the first peacekeeping operation which was given multi-
ple assignments beyond the "traditional" duties. Its main task was to
create the conditions for free and fair elections. For this purpose,
UNTAG monitored the electoral process, which was carried out by
South Africa. It also monitored the rapid reduction, cantonment, and
eventual withdrawal of the South African military presence from
Namibia. Refugees were returned and resettled. An independent jurist
was appointed to advise on disputes that might arise in connection
with the release of political prisoners and detainees. Following the
constituent assembly elections, UNTAG also assisted in the drafting of
the new constitution.
Since Namibia, several large-scale and complex operations have
been undertaken, including the U.N. Transition Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC), the U.N. Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia
(UNPROFOR), and the U.N. operation in Somalia (UNOSOM).
UNTAC was given the ambitious task of supervising a number of
state functions, such as defense, police, foreign affairs and information,
in addition to all other military and civilian tasks. The disarmament of
the parties to the conflict up to an agreed level was not fully attained
due to the resistance of the Khmer Rouge, even though it had agreed
to it in the Paris Accords. Nevertheless, the UNTAC-supervised elec-
tions were successfully carried out and an internationally recognized
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government was formed. Cambodia, therefore, can be characterized
fairly as a qualified success.
UNPROFOR was established in the process of the break-up of
Yugoslavia. Its initial mandate in Croatia was fairly straightforward:
to maintain a cease-fire, facilitate the withdrawal of the Yugoslav
army, demilitarize the U.N. protected areas, and create conditions for
an overall political settlement. Subsequently, however, not only was its
mandate in Croatia expanded, but it was also extended to Bosnia and
Herzegovina when fighting broke out there. UNPROFOR's initial func-
tion in Bosnia was to supervise the re-opening of the Sarajevo airport
and withdrawal of heavy weapons as well as to provide the necessary
protection for humanitarian assistance activities. But its mandate was
also expanded later to include border control, protecting the "safe ar-
eas," supervising the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the exclusion
zones, and assisting in the implementation of the cease-fire and cessa-
tion of hostilities agreements.
The preventive deployment of U.N. peacekeepers was also under-
taken in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. This was the first
such deployment in the history of the U.N. This operation was placed
under UNPROFOR as well.
The mixture of U.N. peacekeeping and such elements of enforce-
ment as the "No-Fly" zone, air strikes, economic sanctions, and the
arms embargo undertaken by NATO, by the western European Union,
and through national means in the same theater of operations, has
made UNPROFOR a very complex and difficult operation. Now,
UNPROFOR faces the challenge of being split into three separate but
still inter-linked operations.
Even though the difficult and not so successful aspects of
UNPROFOR tend to be the focus of media attention, UNPROFOR has
a number of solid accomplishments. It has succeeded in containing the
conflict within the borders of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina,
thus preventing its spread into the wider Balkan area and beyond.
(You may recall that World War I began in Sarajevo.) The U.N. opera-
tion has also provided millions of people with humanitarian assistance
and protection wherever possible.
Peacekeeping missions in general, and UNPROFOR in particular,
are often judged against an idealized solution of the problem. Failure
against this standard is inevitable. It is also artificial. The success of a
peacekeeping mission might better be gauged not by how it would have
played out ideally, but rather by the mandates it has been given and
the way that the situation on the ground would most probably have
developed without it. In an ideal world, the troubled peace of the last
few months in and around Sarajevo would not be interrupted. Realisti-
cally, without the U.N., it would not have occurred at all. In an ideal
world, Srebenica would never have been attacked. Realistically, with-
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out the courage of General Morillon, and those with him, it would have
faced utter devastation. Ideally, the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims would
all have resolved their differences by now. Realistically, the small
areas of peace which have taken form would never have done so with-
out the aid and support which the international community brought to
bear.
The U.N. operation in Somalia became a qualitatively different
operation: the first case of peace enforcement by the U.N. itself. Initial-
ly, the task of the U.N. was to monitor the cease-fire agreement among
the warring factions and to facilitate humanitarian activities. Howev-
er, the U.N. efforts were obstructed and U.N. peacekeepers were un-
able even to establish an effective base of operations. A serious famine
developed. The multinational force (UNITAF), led by the United States
and endorsed by the Security Council, intervened in Somalia on hu-
manitarian grounds. The cooperation of the warring factions was ob-
tained for this operation. The problem arose when the multinational
force was taken over by the second U.N. operation in Somalia
(UNOSOM II). UNOSOM II was given the task of disarming the fac-
tions even, if necessary, by the use of force. No central government
existed, and the security situation was tenuous at best. There was
certainly sufficient ground for giving the U.N. enforcement power.
However, one of the main factions, led by General Aideed, resisted
being disarmed. This resistance eventually led to armed clashes be-
tween the U.N. and the Aideed faction. A serious complicating factor
was the dual operational structure. The United States maintained the
Rapid Reaction Force under its own command. It was this American
force that went into the Aideed-controlled part of Mogadishu and was
ambushed. The American casualties and the television images of the
body of an American soldier being dragged through the streets changed
the picture in Somalia. Once strong American support was lost,
UNOSOM had to be scaled back. The Security Council effectively re-
moved its enforcement function and UNOSOM became a regular
peacekeeping operation. But there was no peace to keep.
In Somalia, the failure of the factions to achieve national reconcil-
iation - a failure widely blamed on the United Nations - led, earlier
this month, to the closing down of the operation in Somalia. UNOSOM
is commonly portrayed as a failure. This is not totally fair. One of the
initial and main motives of the operation in Somalia was to facilitate
humanitarian assistance to those Somalis who had been severely suf-
fering from the effects of long drought, the collapse of the State and
the resultant Civil War. Today, no Somalis are dying from famine.
Schools have reopened in most of the country. In many parts of Soma-
lia outside of Mogadishu, the local government structure and the judi-
cial system the U.N. helped to establish are functioning.
Several major lessons can be learned from Somalia.First, the U.N.
can only support, encourage, and facilitate political reconciliation. It
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cannot force such reconciliation if the parties to the conflict are unwill-
ing to reach an agreement. Second, abandoning the U.N.'s traditional
neutrality and even attacking militarily one of the parties destroys the
U.N.'s credibility and value as a peacekeeping force. Third, a failure to
have unity of command is a recipe for disaster.
Even though the shadows of Somalia and former Yugoslavia tend
to obscure the achievements of the U.N., it must be noted that the
number of successful peacekeeping operations is significant.
I have already mentioned Namibia and Cambodia. The operation
in Mozambique has just concluded. Small, flexible, and excellently led,
it guided Mozambique from civil war to cessation of hostilities to free
and fair elections. The operation has given that country a real opportu-
nity for peace and development. The mission in El Salvador ends a
month from now. The civil war of many years is over. Elections have
been held. Even though some difficult problems, such as land reform,
remain to be fully resolved, that country is well on the way to peace.
Our new operation in Guatemala is underway. Today, in Mexico
City, with strong assistance and guidance from U.N. mediators, the
government and the Revolutionary Unity of Guatemala (URNG) are
scheduled to initial an accord on the rights of indigenous people in
Guatemala.
Before I attempt to bring these points together and look at
peacekeeping's future - at the response to the challenge of the 21st
century - I need to talk a bit about the financing of peacekeeping.
Most operations are financed from a peacekeeping budget, with
member States assessed a set percentage. Under the U.N. Charter,
this is a mandatory, not voluntary, payment. The current formula,
devised in 1973, varies slightly from the regular U.N. formula in that
it requires the five permanent members of the Security Council to pay
a larger percentage than their regular budget share: together, 54%, of
which the U.S. share is just over 30%, compared to the U.S. share of
the regular budget of 25%. The assessment percentages are primarily
based on ability to pay.
As I stated earlier, total peacekeeping costs for 1995 are expected
to be around $3.1 billion, making the U.S. share about $1 billion. How-
ever, Congress has passed a law stating that, beginning in October of
this year - the first month of the new U.S. fiscal year - the U.S. will
pay only 25% of U.N. peacekeeping. This is the same percentage as it
pays of the regular budget.
Intense negotiations are underway among member States to agree
on a new formula which would, among other changes, reduce the U.S.
assessment, but probably not to 25%. To be sure, the U.N. cannot force
any member State to write a check. But our position is, and must be,
that a decision by any member State to change its rate of assessment
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unilaterally is inconsistent with its obligation under the Charter. Ab-
sent any agreed-upon revision of the scale of assessments, we would
treat any shortfall as an arrearage in payments.
Given the present mood in Congress, I'm not sure it makes any
difference to note that all spending of the U.N. system for a year,
$10.5 billion, is $1.90 per human being, and per capita expenditures on
the military and weapons are $150 per person per year. The annual
U.S. bill for U.N. peacekeeping - $1 billion - is almost exactly what
one week of the Vietnam war cost (in 1968 U.S. dollars). And so on.
It is also relevant to note, as the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.,
Madeleine Albright has on numerous occasions, that multilateral oper-
ations allow sharing of personnel, costs, and other burdens rather than
requiring a single State, or group of States, to bear them without as-
sistance.
In sum, what have we learned from 47 years of peacekeeping?
And what does the future hold? First, we can clearly and without res-
ervation affirm the value of U.N. peacekeeping in maintaining the
peace and facilitating negotiations in appropriate situations. To reduce
or even destroy this capability of the international community would
not only be a blow to multilateralism but an affront to common sense.
Second, in several cases we have seen, graphically and tragically,
how dangerous it is to depart from the basic ground rules of peace-
keeping discussed earlier. Perhaps our biggest challenge is to figure
out how we can substantially reinstate those ground rules while still
maintaining the flexibility to meet the new demands, also mentioned
earlier, being placed on peacekeeping. Let us have no illusion that if
we fail to respond multilaterally to these challenges, they can either be
solved by bilateral action, or somehow go away.
Third, we are seeing the increasing and inevitable cohabitation of
peacekeeping operations and humanitarian relief. These activities are
conducted both by U.N. and governmental bodies but, increasingly,
also by private, voluntary organizations. This working relationship
must be examined further and improved significantly. It is increasing-
ly clear that it cannot function well if the peacekeepers take sides in
the conflict.
Fourth, we have learned - and the Security Council, led by the
United States, has become demanding in this regard - that proposed
peacekeeping operations must be more carefully evaluated. They must
also have their goals better defined, costs taken more into account, and
termination dates be set. The current consideration by-the Council of
the deployment of the U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) III
demonstrates this well. Until a set of conditions is met, the deploy-
ment of military contingents will not take place. These conditions in-
clude a cease-fire, disengagement of forces, and freedom of movement
and operations of the initial stages of UNAVEM.
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Such caution is to be applauded. Tragically, it comes in Angola
only after another lesson: peacekeeping "on the cheap," with inade-
quate resources and personnel, simply will not do the job. Several
years ago, an agreement was reached in Angola, and elections were
held. But the two sides were not disarmed. The U.N. presence was
woefully inadequate to deal with the situation. When the two sides
refused to accept the results of the election, war began again. More
people have been killed in Angola in the last two years than in all the
regions combined where the United Nations maintains peacekeeping
operations.
Fifth, we have repeatedly seen the need to speed up the creation
of peacekeeping missions and their deployment. A small, standing U.N.
force, quickly available to the Secretary-General following Security
Council authorization, is, I think, desirable. But it is simply not in the
cards. Major member States have made it clear they will not support
it. What we can do today is to continue our efforts to create trained
units in member States which would be ready for quick assignment
and to strengthen our support and delivery capabilities.
Finally, and most importantly, we have learned that there are
certain things the U.N. realistically cannot, and perhaps should not, be
doing. Here I am speaking of peace enforcement.
It is inevitable that the Security Council will increasingly man-
date regional arrangements and multinational forces to carry out such
operations. This formula, first used in Korea in 1950, was the basis of
Desert Storm. In Desert Storm, the Council authorized member States
to use all necessary means to reverse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The
operation was conducted not in the name of the U.N. but with a man-
date from the U.N. Security Council. This certainly represents a dan-
ger for the U.N.'s credibility and image. The Secretary-General has
called it a "fall back" position and has stated: "We can do nothing
else."
A variation of this is playing out today in Haiti where a multina-
tional force, again led by the U.S. and endorsed by the Council under
the "all necessary means" formula, and, significantly, operating under
Chapter VII of the Charter, is turning over command to a U.N. force
which will operate under Chapter VI. I think we will see more such
two-phase operations in the future.
Before I close, I want to make some comments on U.S.-U.N. rela-
tions. As an international civil servant, I do so cautiously. But I feel
there are some things that need to be said.
The U.N. has certainly had its ups and downs regarding public
support in the U.S., and also regarding the attitude at both ends of
Pennsylvania Avenue. I remember thinking, during the early years of
President Reagan's first term, when the Heritage Foundation burst
onto the scene with the U.N. as one of its main targets, that if we can
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survive this, we can survive anything. (I had not been around some 30
years earlier when McCarren and McCarthy savaged many Americans
in the Secretariat with unproven and unprovable charges that they
were Communists or Communist sympathizers.) But rarely has the
U.N. met with the degree of hostility, even contempt, it now evokes
from some in Washington and from the American right.
I have thought much about why this is the case. It certainly isn't
good politics. Opinion polls consistently show a high and relatively
steady level of popular support for the U.N. Of all the items in the
Contract with America, polls showed the U.N.-related pledge to have
the least support. In part, I think it is based on an image of the U.N.
that is 20 years out of date, a caricature of Communists and third-
world deadbeats using the U.N. forum to criticize the U.S. for imperial-
ism and neo-colonialism simultaneously with outstretched hands and
pleas that the U.S. come to their rescue. There seems to be an un-
awareness, perhaps intentional, that most General Assembly resolu-
tions are now passed by consensus or without a vote; that the budget
is now approved by consensus, and has been at zero-growth in real
terms for several years; and that the use of the veto has virtually dis-
appeared from the Security Council and been replaced by agreement
among the five permanent members. Indeed, the most common com-
plaint I hear in U.N. corridors today is that the organization is totally
dominated by the U.S.
I think Max Frankel came pretty close to an answer to this hostil-
ity in a recent article in The New York Times. He observes that the
right-wing is not isolationist at all. Instead, "they perceive profit not in
ignoring the world but in trashing it .... With Communism in ruins,
they are desperate to find a new foreign enemy that might justify their
nativism. And so to replace the Kremlin they have chosen the United
Nations."2 The Blue Peril has replaced the Red Peril. Richard Dowden,
Diplomatic Editor of The Independent, observed perceptively that "the
important debate is not between isolationists and globalists but be-
tween multilateralists who see the U.S. as a global leader, moving and
working with Allies, and the unilateralists urging it to do whatever it
wants, when it wants, how it wants, with no justification other than
American self-interest. The U.N. appears a large obstacle to the
unilateralist vision. 3
At best, this is unfortunate. At worst, tragic. I hope all of you will
not only reject these allegations of incompatibility of national goals
with United Nations ideals and activities, but will work actively to
2. Max Frankel, Word & Image; Beyond the Shroud, N.Y. TIMES, March 19,
1995, sec. 6, at 30.
3. Richard Dowden, UN Dances to Washington's Tune, THE INDEPENDENT,
March 9, 1995, at 14.
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reinforce the fact that true multilateral cooperation is in everybody's
best interest.
